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BOE Head Thinks Drilling Moratorium Can End "Significantly" Early

by: Bill Egnor AKA Something The Dog Said

Wed Aug 04, 2010 at 06:47:38 AM MST


The new Director of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (OEMRE) (sheesh!) Michael Bromwich said yesterday that the Obama Administration is looking at the possibility of ending the deep water drilling moratorium "significantly" earlier than the Nov. 30 expiration date. This is in response to the uproar from Gulf State lawmakers (most from the radicalized Republican Party) that it is killing jobs.  
Bill Egnor AKA Something The Dog Said :: BOE Head Thinks Drilling Moratorium Can End "Significantly" Early

From the Washington Post article:

In addition to addressing the controversial moratorium, which several oil industry officials and Gulf Coast lawmakers have criticized for delivering an economic blow to the region, Bromwich laid out his vision for creating an assertive federal agency that will police offshore drilling across the country. He noted he has asked the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to lend him prosecutors and agents, respectively, and he is hiring from the private sector to staff an investigations and review unit of eight to 10 people that will explore allegations of wrongdoing within the agency and the drilling industry.

"We have a caseload already and we're working on it," he said. "We will conduct an aggressive investigation of oil and gas company and enforcement of regulations, which has not been a hallmark of this agency in the past."

Bromwich's agency -- the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement -- is also drafting new recusal rules for its employees to ensure an arm's length relationship between regulators and those they oversee, he said, adding there is both the perception and reality that "especially in the Gulf region, there's a limited pool from which we can draw from" in terms of regulators. "That's problematic, for a variety of reasons."

In one way this is a good thing, the new agency, or BOE as they like to call it is actually looking into enforcing the rules that exist. That is a good thing given the level of outright corruption and industry capture the former MMS was engaged in. However it proceeds from a faulty assumption. The Obama Administration is going back to the pre-spill idea that the technology for this kind of exploration is good enough that, when used properly, it is nearly completely safe.

The reality is we just do not know if that is the case. Deep water drilling is challenging in the extreme. Every aspect of the project is as difficult as it can get. They work at depths where the pressure and temperature change the response of materials. The need to work remotely makes everything slower and more open to mistakes. Then there is the fact that we don't have good technology to deal with a major accident like this one. Remember the cap which is now containing the oil had to be developed and built in response to the accident. There was no way to know in advance the specific problems of this blow out.

Even if there technology is actually sufficient to pursue this endeavor with relative safety, it is clear that the enforcement of safety regulations has been lax, probably to a criminal level. To assume that we can change this in a short period of time is a bad assumption. Four of the five largest companies in the world are Oil companies (the fifth is Wal-Mart). This gives them an enormous amount of influence, both in the United States and the world. It is this influence that was a major part of the reason that the rules were not enforced in the first place.

BOE is getting help from the FBI and the DOJ to investigate right now, but that is a temporary fix for what looks like a long term problem. Sooner or later (lets face it, it is going to be sooner) the FBI and DOJ are going to need their resources and will pull them from BOE. Without the man power to aggressively investigate and inspect the drilling operations we will be back to where we were before Deepwater Horizon and BP dumped 5 million gallons of toxic crude oil into the Gulf. There will be plenty of room for shenanigans out of sight of the inspectors and regulators.

I keep hearing about the jobs that are going to be lost. There is no doubt that LA and other Gulf States have a vested employment interest in having drilling going on. However this argument ignores the tens of thousands of jobs and businesses that have been wiped out or will be wiped out by a spill like this. It is the height of pennywise and pound foolish to argue we have to go back to rolling the dice on a disaster because the people who made the disaster might lose their jobs.

The Nov. 30 moratorium expiration date is really very modest. Even with the best will in the world we can't be ready in a technical or regulatory sense by that date to assure that we will not have another spill of this magnitude. By then we will not have the new rules in place, nor have fully investigated a fully corrupted agency and removed the corrupt individuals. To assume we can just start up again by this time is more like crossing our fingers than taking action on an issue of this magnitude.

The heart of this problem is the structure of the BOE, which like the MMS before it is just an agency created by Executive Order. It has no direct purse-strings that Congress can pull on, it has almost no oversight by anyone other than the Interior Secretary. Worse Congress has mandated procedures which make it very difficult for the agency to really look at the risks of a drilling plan. By law the agency only has 30 days to approve or disapprove of a drilling request. This clearly is not enough time to check the complex and critical details of something as complex as drilling one mile or more below the oceans surface.

What we need is a Congressional mandate for this agency. This will keep it from blowing in the political winds every time a new Administration with new priorities comes to power. It will allow for a closer look at an agency which has been in the pocket of the industry it was supposed to regulate for the last 30 years.

It may be that there is very little that can be done to prevent future deep water exploration. The perception that we will some how become less dependent on foreign oil if we develop these resources is a false one but it is embedded in the national psyche at this point and will be acted on. This being the case all we can do is argue, loudly and insistently that it be as safe as possible.

The first step to safety is not rushing. Under no circumstances should the moratorium be lifted early. If anything it should extended until both the technology and the regulatory enforcement is strong enough to be affective. To do anything else is to risk the perhaps hundreds of billions of dollars, millions of jobs and some unknown and unknowable number of lives if another disaster like this happens.

Safety is possible. It is possible to find all the failure modes and address them in such as way that they become nearly impossible. 6 Sigma is 3.4 defects per million opportunities. If we set that level of safety and enforce it drilling in deep water can probably be safe enough. The problem will be the push back from an industry that has basically regulated itself for three decades. For all that they will claim that safety is the number one priority, they will also be constantly and with wide open check books (thanks Citizens United) argue for going back the Wild West days when it was a lot cheaper to cut corners. If that happens it is only a question of when not if there will be another massive and destructive spill in our primary fishery, the Gulf of Mexico.

The floor is yours.  

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Letting Them Self-Regulate Is a Formula for Repeat
I agree that a 6-sigma approach to the management of offshore drilling is both possible and should be implemented.  We need to remember that this "accident" was caused by a management decision on the platform.  In dangerous and potentially damaging processes, all equipment and procedures must be properly working or they shut down. Among those who are knowledgeable about oil rig operations,  this was not the case in the BP Blowout.  A reminder
The BP testimony to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on May 25 says it all, but perhaps that material needs to be explained. From looking at that evidence, this is what we know:

1) When cementing the production casing the cementing crew, which was being supervised by BP, had difficulty landing the top plug into the casing shoe. This was the first "red flag" because a satisfactory cement job to the production string is fundamental to the safe operation on a go forward basis. The fact that the cement job did not go as planned should have caused the testing operation that followed to be carefully scrutinized, it clearly was not.

2) As is normal practice, the integrity of the pressure tight seal was tested by pressuring up on the casing and observing the pressure response. If pressure bleeds off there is clearly a problem with the pressure integrity of the shoe, However, industry practice dictates that a positive test, that is no pressure drop, is not diagnostic, simply because the reservoir pressure is sufficient to retain the pressure being applied. A negative test is useful because it is diagnostic of a failed cement job. In this case the test was positive.

3) Again, as is normal industry practice a negative pressure test was run, with pressure released from inside the casing and the pressure response was measured. In this case evidence has been bought before the committee that there was a 1,400 psi pressure response. This response is highly diagnostic and is therefore the second "red flag" and at this point the BP supervisors should have concluded that they had what the industry calls a "wet shoe." That is that the cement job had failed to form a seal at the casing around the reservoir which we know contains high pressure oil and gas.

4) At this point a decision should have been made to do a remedial cement job; this is an expensive operation, but having seen a 1,400 psi response, there was no choice.

5) The BP engineers then proceeded with the balance of the operation to temporarily abandon the well. This meant replacing the 14-pound-per-gallon mud that was in the wellbore with 8.5-pound-per-gallon sea water. The denser mud had been, up until this time, the primary pressure control and was keeping the hydrocarbons in place despite the lack of an adequate cement job at the casing shoe.

Given the two red flags that had been thrown up previously, one would have expected that as a precaution a cement plug would have been placed somewhere in the wellbore as a secondary pressure seal before this primary pressure control system (heavy mud) was evacuated from the wellbore. But at the very least the mud replacement operation should have been heavily scrutinized. Clearly it was not.

6) Evidence provided at the hearing, including the pressure data transmitted from the rig for the last two hours before the explosion, is diagnostic. At 8:20 p.m. on the day of the explosion the pressure data suggest there was a constant flow of sea water being pumped into the drill pipe that was displacing the heavier mud system which was the primary pressure control for the well. The rate going in was 900 gallons per minute, but the flow data of mud coming out was steadily increasing from 900 gallons a minute at 8:20 p.m. to a rate of 1,200 gallons per minute at 8:34 p.m. During this 14-minute period one can conclude that hydrocarbons were flowing and pushing more fluid from the wellbore than was being pumped in.

This is what this data is supposed to monitor, but the well flow evidence would appear to have been ignored, because at this point the BP rig supervisors should have gone to a well kill operation and started to pump heavy mud back into the well bore to restore the primary control mechanism. Instead the mud continued to be evacuated.

7) At 9:08 there was another piece of evidence that is very clear cut. The sea water pump was shut down presumably to check the well stability. However, with the pump shut down a pressure increase was seen in the standpipe (SPP). This pressure response has to be associated with the reservoir flowing hydrocarbons and again at this point kill operations should have been initiated by the BP engineers.

8) From 9:08 p.m. to around 9:30, despite the sea-water pump either running at a constant volume or shut-in, the SPP continued to increase; again this is evidence that the well is producing hydrocarbons and should have caused a kill operation to be initiated.

9) At 9:30 p.m. the seawater pump was again shut-in to presumably observe what the well was doing, and again there is a notable increase in the standpipe pressure.

10) At 9:49 the SPP showed a very large increase and the explosion followed-this is obviously the point at which the gas and oil reached the drill floor and found an ignition source.

Mr. Hayward and BP have taken the position that this tragedy is all about a fail-safe blow-out preventer (BOP) failing, but in reality the BOP is really the backup system, and yes we expect that it will work. However, all of the industry practice and construction systems are aimed at ensuring that one never has to use that device. Thus the industry has for decades relied on a dense mud system to keep the hydrocarbons in the reservoir and everything that is done to maintain wellbore integrity is tested, and where a wellbore integrity test fails, remedial action is taken.

This well failed its casing integrity test and nothing was done. The data collected during a critical operation to monitor hydrocarbon inflow was ignored and nothing was done. This spill is about human failure and it is time BP put its hand up and admitted that.

If procedures are in place and they are followed, accidents are more apt to be random than preventable.  This was preventable, and a recurrence should be unacceptable through higher bonding operator deposits and closer regulation and enforcement.  


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